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Abstract  
According to an increasingly popular view in epistemology and philosophy of mind, beliefs are 
sensitive to contextual factors such as practical factors and salient error possibilities. A 
prominent version of this view, called credal sensitivism, holds that the context-sensitivity of 
belief is due to the context-sensitivity of degrees of belief or credence. Credal sensitivism comes 
in two variants: while credence-one sensitivism (COS) holds that maximal confidence (credence 
one) is necessary for belief, threshold credal sensitivism (TCS) holds that belief consists in 
having credence above some threshold, where this threshold doesn’t require maximal confidence. 
In this paper, I argue that COS has difficulties in accounting for three important features about 
belief: i) the compatibility between believing p and assigning non-zero credence to certain error 
possibilities that one takes to entail not-p, ii) the fact that outright beliefs can occur in different 
strengths, and iii) beliefs held by unconscious subjects. I also argue that TCS can easily avoid 
these problems. Finally, I consider an alleged advantage of COS over TCS in terms of explaining 
beliefs about lotteries. I argue that lottery cases are rather more problematic for COS than TCS. 
In conclusion, TCS is the most plausible version of credal sensitivitism. 
 
Keywords: belief; credence; doxastic sensitivism; credal sensitivism; credence-one view; 
threshold view  
 
1. Introduction 
It seems nearly a platitude that contextual factors can influence our dispositions to form, revise 
or retain certain beliefs. We are not unfamiliar with the experience that in high stakes situations 
we often refrain from believing things that we used to believe when stakes were low. For 
example, you first believe that the radio is playing a Sibelius quartet and are tempted to make a 
remark like “This Sibelius quartet is well performed.” But upon realizing the risk of incurring 
disapproval from your companion who is knowledgeable about music and very critical, you may 
find your conviction that what is being played is a Sibelius quartet shaken and decide to remain 
silent. Likewise, we tend to lose beliefs when certain error possibilities are made salient. For 
instance, at the zoo you form a belief that the animal behind the fence is a zebra, but when your 
partner raises the possibility that some zebras in the zoo might have been replaced with cleverly 
painted mules, you may start doubting whether you are looking at a real zebra.  
Let’s label doxastic sensitivism the cluster of views that accommodate the above observations by 
holding that whether one believes a proposition p depends on or is affected by contextual factors 
such as practical factors and salient error-possibilities. Doxastic sensitivists have defended their 
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views on various grounds. Brian Weatherson (2005), Dorit Ganson (2008), and Jeremy Fantl & 
Matthew McGrath (2009) have advanced specific functionalist accounts of belief entailing 
doxastic sensitivism. According to these accounts, believing something involves having certain 
behavioural dispositions that are influenced by contextual factors. One of these dispositions is 
being willing to act on the believed proposition (viz., as if that proposition was true). Since 
whether one is willing to act on p is partly influenced by contextual factors, these accounts imply 
that belief is sensitive to shifts of context. Another version of doxastic sensitivism endorsed by  
Jennifer Nagel (2008, 2010) explores psychological (rather than metaphysical) aspects of belief. 
Drawing upon a substantial body of empirical studies, Nagel shows that contextual settings play 
an important role in determining the kind and degree of cognitive effort one is willing to allocate 
in order to reach a settled opinion. These data indicate a systematic sensitivity of belief regulation 
to contextual factors. Moreover, Daniel Greco (2015), Dylan Dodd (2017) and Roger Clarke 
(2018) have defended the context-sensitivity of belief by appealing to an analogy between belief 
and sincere assertion. Conversations are commonly conceived as taking place against a 
background of mutual presuppositions, the so-called ‘common ground’. Just as the common 
ground to which interlocutors restrict their attention constitutes the context for conversation, 
the set of error possibilities to which a believer restricts her attention constitutes the context for 
her doxastic attitudes. As the context for assertion evolves with the common ground, what it 
takes for one to count as believing that p evolves with shifts of doxastic context.1 
Almost all doxastic sensitivists so far agree that full belief is constituted by certain degrees of 
belief (credences). Disagreements amongst these philosophers arise with respect to the following 
two issues:  
i) Does full belief require maximal degree of credence?  
ii) Are credences also context-sensitive?  
On the one hand, some doxastic sensitivists including Weatherson, Ganson and Fantl & 
McGrath provide negative answers to both questions.2 Concerning the first question, they hold 
the threshold view of belief, according to which belief consists in having a degree of credence above 
a certain threshold but falling short of maximal confidence (i.e. credence one).3 , 4 Concerning the 
second question, they endorse threshold sensitivism, according to which the context-sensitivity of 
belief is due to a corresponding sensitivity of the threshold on credence necessary for belief, not 
to a sensitivity of credence itself.  
On the other hand, Clarke (2013), Greco (2015) and Dodd (2017) defend positive answers to 
both questions. They advocate the credence-one view, which says that belief requires credence one or 
maximal confidence. On their views, since the threshold on credence necessary for belief is fixed 
(i.e. one), beliefs cannot be context-sensitive unless credences are as well. Let’s label this position 
credence-one sensitivism (henceforth COS). Call credal sensitivism the more general view according to 
which credences are context-sensitive, and it is their context-sensitivity that explains the context-
sensitivity of belief. COS is a specific version of credal sensitivism. 
In an attempt to adjudicate the second question above, in Gao (2019) I have argued that a wide 
range of empirical and intuitive data favour credal sensitivism over threshold sensitivism. In this 
paper, I shall assume that my conclusions in Gao (2019) are correct, and thus that credal 
sensitivism is right. My goal is to advance the dispute, internal to credal sensitivism, concerning 
whether full belief requires maximal credence or not. I shall compare two credal sensitivist 
                                               
1 Still another variant of doxastic sensitivism is defended by Bach (2005).  
2 See also Kyburg (1983) and Sturgeon (2008). 
3 With threshold view here I mean any view of outright belief admitting a threshold of credence below 
one, no matter whether this threshold is context-sensitive or not. This notion of ‘threshold view’ is wider 
than that discussed by Weatherson (2005). [acknowledgment] 
4 Nagel also expresses her sympathy for the threshold view (Nagel 2010: 417-18).  
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positions: COS and threshold credal sensitivism (henceforth TCS). The peculiar feature of TCS is that, 
while this view holds that the context-sensitivity of belief is due to the context-sensitivity of 
credence, it denies that belief requires maximal credence and endorses the threshold view—TCS 
answers NO to question (i) and YES to question (ii). I shall assess these two views given their 
explanatory power in accommodating a series of desiderata of belief. My conclusion is that TCS 
fares better than COS in accommodating these desiderata. This constitutes prima facie evidence 
for the further conclusion that TCS is the most plausible version of credal pragmatism. 
Here is the structure of the paper. In §2, I introduce in more detail my favourite version of TCS 
and the version of COS endorsed by Clarke and Greco. In §3, I argue that TCS is better placed 
than COS in accounting for three important features about belief: i) the compatibility between 
believing that p and assigning non-zero credence to certain possibilities that one takes to entail 
not-p, ii) the fact that outright beliefs can be held in different strengths, and iii) beliefs held by 
unconscious subjects. In §4, I consider an alleged advantage of COS over TCS: that COS fares 
better than TCS in explaining beliefs about lotteries. While I think that TCS has the resources to 
accommodate lottery cases, I shall argue that under closer inspection such cases are more 
problematic for COS than TCS.  
Before proceeding further, let me be clear from the outset on the scope of this paper. My goal 
here is restricted to the comparative question of which amongst credal sensitivism accounts is 
better. It is not an aim of the present paper to provide a full-fledged defence of credal 
sensitivism. Thus I will not be concerned, for example, with the advantages and problems that 
credal sensitivism has compared to its alternatives. These issues have already been discussed 
elsewhere.5 Those rejecting credal sensitivism or withholding opinion on the matter are free to 
read my conclusion as merely conditional: amongst versions of credal sensitivism, the more 
plausible one is TCS. 
That said, it is worth observing that at least some of the arguments proposed in §3 and §4 have a 
wider scope, insofar as they address the more general debate between the threshold view and the 
credence-one view. As acknowledged by Clarke and Greco, the credence-one view is only 
plausible when it is combined with credal sensitivism. If my objections to COS in §3 and §4 are 
on the right track, the only plausible form of credence-one view would be undermined, and the 
threshold view would emerge as the final winner from the debate.  
 
 
2. TCS and COS 
In this section, I will first introduce the specific version of TCS that I endorse (§2.1) and the 
version of COS defended by Clarke (2013) and Greco (2015) (§2.2). I will then highlight the 
crucial differences between TCS and COS (§2.3). 
 
2.1. TCS 
TCS is constituted by the conjunction of the following two positions: 
 
(The Threshold View) Belief consists in having credence above some 
threshold falling below probability one. 
                                               
5 Besides the arguments provided by Clarke and Greco, other advantages of credal sensitivism include 
its ability to explain a series of empirical and linguistic data [Author a]. The main problem for credal 
sensitivism concerns the tension between the contextual sensitivity of doxastic attitudes and evidentialist 
standards of epistemic rationality governing these attitudes. For responses, see [Author a, §3] and Clarke 
(2013, §6). 
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(Credal Sensitivism) Credences are context-sensitive, and the context-
sensitivity of credence explains the context-sensitivity of belief.  
 
Let me introduce three important remarks about TCS. First, traditionally, the threshold view has 
been taken to commit to the metaphysical reduction of belief to credences. The threshold view 
that I consider here is neutral on reductivism. TCS merely says that believing p involves having 
credences above a certain threshold and leaves it open whether full belief is ontologically 
derivative from credences. Thus, the view is also compatible with dualist approaches claiming 
that belief is metaphysically distinct from credence.6  
Second, the contextual factors relevant to credal sensitivism include the set of possibilities one 
takes seriously (or live/salient possibilities) as well as various perceived practical factors. As for 
the practical factors, in Gao (2019) I have suggested that they could be divided into two sets 
given their effects on normal people’s doxastic attitudes. On the one hand, caution-oriented factors 
have the effect of leading one to form or retain beliefs only on the basis of more evidence 
and/or more cognitive efforts. Examples are high costs of being wrong, significant benefits of 
achieving accurate conclusions, the availability of further evidence, etc. On the other hand, rush-
oriented factors have the effect of leading one to believe on the basis of less evidence and fewer 
cognitive efforts. Examples are considerable benefits of having a settled opinion, remarkable 
costs of not having a settled view, difficulty of acquiring further evidence, etc.7 According to 
TCS, credences are sensitive to contextual factors in the following ways: other things being equal, 
in the formation of a doxastic attitude about a proposition p, the more possibilities related to p 
one considers, and/or the more significant the influence of caution-oriented factors is, the lower 
the subject’s degree of credence in p (normally) is. Conversely, the fewer possibilities related to p 
one considers, and/or the more significant the influence of rush-oriented factors is, the higher 
the subject’s degree of credence in p (normally) is. 
Third, according to my favourite version of TCS, the context-sensitivity of belief and credence is 
not a constitutive component of the metaphysical nature of these attitudes. Rather, the influence 
of contextual factors is taken to be a merely psychological fact. In my view, the context-
sensitivity of doxastic attitudes characterizes a contingent aspect of the actual regulation of 
doxastic attitudes of normal subjects (where ‘normal’ is used in a descriptive, frequentist sense), 
capturing regularities which are largely predictable by psychology. In this view, in accordance 
with the traditional picture, both belief and credence are two-place relations between subjects 
and propositions.8 One could conceive alternative versions of TCS that build context-sensitivity 
into the nature of doxastic attitudes. These views would consider context as part of the 
metaphysical structure of doxastic attitudes: belief and credence would be relations between 
subjects, propositions and contexts. For reasons that will become clear below, in this article I 
shall only consider a psychological version of TCS. However, it is important to keep in mind that 
this is not the only possible version of the view.   
 
2.2. COS 
COS is the conjunction of the credence-one view and credal sensitivism. According to Clarke, 
Dodd and Greco, the space of salient (live) possibilities defines the relevant context to which 
                                               
6 See e.g., Ross and Schroeder (2014), Jackson (forthcoming), and Weisberg (forthcoming). 
7 In the context of the present debate, these factors have been invoked by, for example, Gerken (2011, 
2017), Nagel (2008) and appear in psychology works such as Kruglanski and Webster (1991), Kruglanski 
et al. (1993), Mayseless and Kruglanski (1987) and Webster (1993). 
8 One may add a further temporal value to the relation. What is important is that the potential effects 
of contextual factors on doxastic attitudes are not part of fundamental metaphysical relations constitutive 
of doxastic attitudes.  
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beliefs are sensitive.9 In addition, the context doesn’t merely contingently affect the psychology 
of normal subjects’ beliefs, but is built directly into the metaphysical constitution of beliefs. 
Belief is conceived as a three-place relation between a believer, a proposition and a context. In 
this picture, in order to answer the question ‘Does S believe that p?’, one has to consider also the 
specific context the subject is in.10 
 According to COS, the space of salient possibilities determines a relevant set of doxastic 
possibilities over which the credence function distributes. The space of salient possibilities varies 
depending on the range of salient possibilities and how likely one takes each possibility to be.11 If 
one believes p in a particular context c, p must be true throughout the whole set of salient 
possibilities in c. In such cases, not-p-possibilities are completely ruled out in c, and one’s 
credence in p automatically receives probability one in that context.  
Importantly, COS is distinct from what is often labelled the certainty view of belief according to 
which if one believes that p, then one attributes credence one to p across all contexts. The certainty 
view struggles with a series of notorious problems. As illustrated in Clarke (2013) and Greco 
(2015), COS nicely avoids almost all of them. Since according to COS believing with the 
maximal degree of confidence should not be taken to entail certainty across contexts, the view 
avoids the sceptical consequence that falling short of absolute (non-contextual) certainty in p 
excludes belief in p. Likewise, it also avoids attributing problematic dispositions to someone 
believing p, such as dispositions to judge bets on whether p is true as fair when the stakes are 
extremely high. Offering a bet could result in changing the context. When the stakes on whether 
p change, as it should be when a bet is offered, the space of salient alternatives relevant to 
whether p is also likely to change (e.g. more alternatives become salient) and the confidence in p 
inevitably lowers. 
 
2.3. Differences between TCS and COS 
In addition to the obvious difference concerning the degree of credence required for belief, TCS 
and COS also differ in the following three aspects. First, as already mentioned above, COS takes 
belief to be a three-place relation between a believer, a proposition and a context. Hence, the 
context-sensitivity of doxastic attitudes is part of the metaphysical nature of belief: it’s part of the 
nature of belief that it is a kind of mental state individuated by a context. In contrast, TCS takes 
context-sensitivity to be a purely psychological matter: people’s degrees of confidence and beliefs are 
normally influenced by features of the context, but the latter is not part of the nature of these 
doxastic attitudes. 
Second, COSists and TCSists disagree on the range of possibilities over which the credence 
function distributes. For COSists, the relevant space exclusively consists of salient possibilities. 
The relevant set of doxastic possibilities is thus small, variable and presumably tractable for 
working memory. Since in this picture the context is defined in terms of the space of live 
possibilities, it trivially follows that the space itself co-varies with the shift of context, as new 
possibilities become live while others cease to be salient. In contrast, in accordance with the 
traditional picture, TCSists take the space of relevant possibilities to be consistent across 
                                               
9 For a similar position, see Norby (2015). 
10 Are there psychological versions of COS? A difficulty in developing this kind of view is that it is 
unclear how to determine a doxastically relevant space of live error possibilities in a circumstance without 
making reference to a context. In this respect, according to COS, contexts seem to be essential, 
constitutive features of belief, not mere contingent psychological aspects of this kind of mental state.  
11 Clarke (2013, 2018) only mentions the former mechanism of credence shifts, while Greco (2015, p. 
185) also hints at the latter when he says “we think of the common ground as involving presuppositions 
not just about which possibilities are taken seriously, but also about how likely those possibilities are” 
(italics original). 
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contexts, covering all possibilities that one might take into consideration, not just the salient ones. 
The credence function is ‘global’, defined over the whole space of possibilities. The relevant set 
of doxastic possibilities is large, presumably not tractable for working memory and relatively 
stable across context shifts. Variable practical factors very rarely bring about changes to the set 
of possibilities relevant for TCS.  
A third important difference, related to the above distinction, is that TCSists and COSists 
provide different stories about the mechanisms responsible for credence variations. For TCSists, 
the distribution of probabilities is directly a factor of context-shifts. These probability 
distribution changes are not mediated by changes in the set of relevant possibilities. For COSists, 
in addition to re-distributions of credences over the same set of salient possibilities, credence 
variations can also be (and often are) due to more or fewer possibilities being included in the set 
of salient possibilities.  
A consequence of this important difference is that the two theories provide different 
explanations of cases where outright beliefs are gained and lost. For example, consider a case 
where the subject loses belief that p given an increase in the perceived stakes on whether p is true. 
According to COS, one loses belief that p in the high-stakes situation because some possibility 
entailing not-p has been added to the set of live possibilities and as a result the subject’s credence 
in p falls under probability one. On the contrary, according to TCS, the shift from a low- to a 
high-stakes situation has the effect that the subject assigns a lower probability to p to such a 
degree that the subject’s credence in p falls below the threshold of credence necessary for 
belief—for example, the credence in p decreases from 0.98 to 0.9, where the threshold for belief 
is 0.95.  
 
 
3. TCS vs. COS 
In this section, I will evaluate TCS and COS against three important features of belief: i) the 
compatibility between believing that p and assigning non-zero credence to certain error 
possibilities that one takes to entail not-p (§3.1), ii) the fact that outright beliefs can occur in 
different strengths (§3.2), and iii) beliefs held by unconscious subjects (§3.3). I will argue that 
while COS has difficulties in accommodating these features, TCS does not. 
 
3.1. Belief and non-ignored possibilities 
The first feature of belief concerns cases in which one believes p in spite of assigning minimal 
positive credence to certain possibilities that one takes to entail not-p. Two types of error 
possibility are relevant here: far-fetched and non-far-fetched.  
 
3.1.1 Belief and far-fetched possibilities 
Let’s first consider cases involving far-fetched possibilities. These are possibilities that from the 
subjective perspective are utterly unlikely to happen. Typical examples are sceptical scenarios. 
For instance, the possibility that you are a brain embedded in a vat of nutrients and wired to a 
sophisticated computer program that generates perceptual experiences about the outside world, 
or the possibility that all your perceptual experiences and memories are actually induced by a 
powerful evil demon. Far-fetched possibilities also include extremely bizarre scenarios. Here are 
some examples: i) the possibility that within a short while, the particles belonging to the surface 
of your desk remain more or less unmoved but the material inside the desk unfolds in a bizarre 
enough way that the system no longer counts as a desk (Hawthorne 2004: 4-5); ii) that the matter 
in your car has spontaneously reorganized in the form of a giant lizard (MacFarlane 2005: 201); 
and iii) that the egg I just dropped on the floor will suddenly jump back up into my hand and be 
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whole again, as if I never had dropped it (Dodd 2017: 4607). When we are forced to 
acknowledge the existence of such possibilities, we do at least sometimes attribute some positive 
probability to such far-fetched possibilities, even if it might be a minimal value. 
According to COS, if one believes p one’s credence in p is one and credence in possibilities that 
one takes to entail not-p is zero. In other words, if one assigns any positive credence to 
possibilities that one takes to entail not-p, no matter how low, according to COS one does not 
believe p. Now it seems clear that there are cases where one becomes aware of a certain far-
fetched error possibility and thereby attributes a non-zero chance to its happening. Nonetheless, 
entertaining such error possibilities doesn’t seem to affect one’s outright belief. Consider cases 
where one is aware of the possibility of a sceptical scenario. Presumably, upon learning about the 
possible occurrence of the scenario, one registers that possibility. For example, one takes as 
possible that our cognitive systems might be embedded in a virtual simulation. In such a case, it 
is possible that one forms a sceptical attitude towards the reality of the external world and drops 
her ordinary beliefs. But it is also possible (and indeed pretty common) that one does not revise 
her ordinary beliefs while at the same time being mindful of the possibility of the sceptical 
scenario. Such a possibility has been recognized by several philosophers. For example, according 
to Jonathan Adler: 
[E]ven when a counter-possibility is accepted (regarded as relevant), in radical 
cases the persuasion is often half-hearted. The student who is moved by your 
dreaming argument to sincerely deny that he knows that he is in the classroom 
does not cease to believe that he is in the classroom. (2012: 264)  
It is natural to interpret the student in Adler’s quote as one who understands the argument and 
recognizes the sceptical scenario as an open possibility but leaves her ordinary beliefs intact. In 
this case, the student assigns a positive credence to the possibility of that scenario, for she 
cannot really deny its possibility no matter how improbable she thinks it is, even though she 
deems the possibility as merely idle. The same happens in other cases where one maintains her 
ordinary belief but at the same time cannot dispel some bizarre possibility.12  
Apparently, COS delivers the wrong prediction in this type of cases. According to COS, as long 
as one recognises error possibilities that one takes to be incompatible with p, no matter how low 
the credence one assigns to those possibilities, one’s credence in p would be less than one, and 
hence one would not count as believing p. COS can accommodate cases involving losses of 
ordinary beliefs when one is fully persuaded by arguments for scepticism, but it cannot explain 
cases where one’s ordinary beliefs manage to survive sceptical considerations.  
Here COSists might bite the bullet and question the compatibility of maintaining ordinary beliefs 
and entertaining far-fetched error possibilities at the same time. In this regard, Dodd (2017: 
4613-4) emphasizes the infelicity of asserting sentences such as ‘the egg I just dropped on the 
floor will stay on the floor (it will not suddenly jump back up into my hand and be whole again) 
but it is possible that it won’t’. Assuming that full assertions are the expressions of outright 
beliefs, this (alleged) infelicity would indicate the incompatibility of maintaining an ordinary 
belief that p while at the same time entertaining far-fetched error possibilities that not-p.  
In response, I must admit that I find the above and similar assertions perfectly felicitous. Other 
assertions having a similar syntactical structure, such as those taken to exemplify the Moore’s 
paradox, may sound infelicitous (e.g. ‘the bank will be open on Saturday but it is possible that it 
won’t be’). However, the error possibility in most of those paradoxical assertions is practically 
relevant. By uttering such sentences, the speaker is representing herself as being ‘of two minds’ 
on whether she takes p for granted in practical reasoning, and hence as being affected by 
psychological confusion (Dougherty and Rysiew 2009, pp. 128-129). Far-fetched possibilities 
                                               
12 MacFarlane (2005, p. 201) and Gerken (2012, p.141) also suggest that we tend to dismiss very far-
fetched salient alternatives as epistemically irrelevant.  
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often do not have this kind of practical significance. Many concessive assertions involving far-
fetched possibilities do not convey contradictory information about one’s practical dispositions. 
My contention is that, at least to the ears of interlocutors who do not take the far-fetched 
possibility at issue to be practically relevant, concessive assertions such as ‘even though there is a 
very remote chance that the material inside my desk has unfolded in a bizarre enough way that 
the system no longer counts as a desk, I still believe that my desk is here under my eyes’ can be 
perceived as perfectly felicitous. This is a clear indication that outright beliefs are compatible 
with the consideration of far-fetched error possibilities.  
Notice also that the claim that we always lose ordinary beliefs every single time we consider a 
far-fetched error possibility is pretty implausible from an empirical perspective. To rebut this 
claim, it is sufficient to point to someone who sticks to her ordinary beliefs while also admitting 
the error possibility. Finding similar examples seems to me extremely easy: I just have to 
consider by introspection my own beliefs about quantum mechanics as well as the belief that 
there is a desk in front of me. 
 
3.1.2 Belief and non-far-fetched possibilities 
Now let’s consider cases of belief involving positive credence in non-far-fetched error 
possibilities. One prominent example concerns one’s recognition of the fallibility of belief-
forming methods, such as perception, testimony, inference, etc. By ‘fallibility’, I mean that it is 
possible to acquire false information by using a certain belief-forming method. Presumably, 
when one considers the fallibility of a belief-forming method, she attributes a non-zero credence 
to the possibility of getting false beliefs via that method. Considerations of fallible belief-forming 
methods constitute salient non-far-fetched error possibilities about beliefs formed via those 
methods. They are non-far-fetched or mundane possibilities because they are usually not as 
improbable (in the subjective sense of probability) as radical sceptical scenarios or bizarre 
possibilities.  
It’s almost unanimously agreed that we don’t take all our belief-forming methods to be infallible. 
The problem is whether we refrain from forming outright beliefs on the basis of a certain belief-
forming method when we consciously acknowledge the fallibility of that method. Imagine that 
you have just acquired some information from testimony. At the same time, you are 
contemplating the fallibility of testimony as a method of true beliefs’ acquisition. Assume also 
that there are barely no stakes hanging on the truth of that testimony. Although the possibility 
that the testimony is wrong is salient to you, you find it somewhat of an overreaction not to 
accept the testimony you have just received and form a belief on its basis. After all, you also 
realise that the fallibility of testimony doesn’t vanish just because you do not think about it, and 
normally in similar circumstances you would form a belief with no hesitation. So why should you 
treat the present situation differently? It is unreasonable to think that, merely in virtue of 
entertaining the thought that testimony is fallible, I would undermine the possibility of holding a 
belief that p acquired through testimony. As a matter of fact, this combination of beliefs about 
the fallibility and the content of the testimony seems clearly possible. Indeed, on reflection, I 
must admit that I myself entertain many similar combinations of doxastic attitudes. 13 
COS, again, delivers the wrong prediction in this type of cases. According to COS, once one 
recognizes the fallibility of certain belief-forming methods, and one considers that a belief was 
formed on the basis of that method, one automatically stops having that belief. This is because 
by recognizing the fallibility of one’s belief that p, one assigns a non-zero credence to not-p, and 
thereby ceases to have credence one in p and loses that belief.  
                                               
13 For a similar observation applied to assertibility see Worsnip (2016: 555). Note that while Worsnip is 
mainly concerned with assertions, my objection concerns the compatibility of belief and certain error 
possibilities at the psychological level.  
 9 
Furthermore, according to COS, entertaining the fallibility of a certain belief-forming method 
would result in the suspension, not just of some specific beliefs, but of all beliefs which one 
takes to be formed by relying on that method. According to Clarke (2013), once it is settled 
which possibilities are live for a subject in a given context, the subject’s remaining doxastic 
attitudes are adjusted as if she was conditionalising on those live possibilities. This implies that 
the consideration of belief-forming methods’ fallibility would affect a very large number of 
beliefs, i.e. all beliefs that one takes to be formed by relying on that method, and the subject’s 
credences in all those beliefs would fall below one. Hence, COS predicts that the subject would 
stop believing all those propositions formed via that method in the moment in which she 
acknowledged the method’s fallibility. However, this is clearly not the case. We don’t abandon all 
beliefs that we take to be formed on the basis of a certain method such as perception by simply 
realising that the method is fallible.14  
In contrast, TCS and the threshold view in general can easily accommodate the above data. 
According to TCS, one can continue believing p as long as one’s credence in possibilities that 
one takes to entail not-p does not pass a certain threshold. Thus, it’s coherent for TCS that a 
thinker can believe p while at the same time assigning a minimal probability to certain error 
possibilities that she takes to entail not-p.  
 
3.2. Beliefs with different strengths 
Full beliefs come in different degrees. We believe many things, but we don’t believe them with 
the same strength. We are more confident in some of them than in others. For example, 
although I believe both that one plus one equals two and that my partner was a good football 
player before we met, I am more confident of the former than the latter. Moreover, if someone 
already outright believes p, but acquires new evidence for it, her confidence in the belief naturally 
rises to a higher degree. This indicates that the degree of confidence in an outright belief can be 
less than maximal, and thus that beliefs come in different degrees.  
Clarke (2013, §7.3) claims that both COS and the threshold view are able to accommodate the 
above platitude. Nonetheless, although COS can explain degrees of partial belief in terms of 
degrees of credence falling short of credence one, the view cannot explain degrees of full beliefs 
in the same way. According to COS, one’s credences in all one’s beliefs have the maximal degree, 
i.e. one. Thus COSists cannot explain the different strengths of outright beliefs in terms of 
variations in credence. This doesn’t mean that there are no ways in which they can explain this 
phenomenon. Clarke (2013 p. 11) suggests that the fact that one is more confident in some 
beliefs than in others is reflected in the stability of one’s opinion. Beliefs held more firmly are 
                                               
14 The inconsistency between acknowledging one’s fallibility and maintaining relevant ordinary beliefs 
may be conceived as a specific version of the preface paradox. According to one approach to the paradox 
suggested by Clarke (2017), there’s a shift of context between acknowledging the preface and considering 
a specific claim in the book. Very general error possibilities are live in the preface context but not the 
book context. Therefore, relative to the preface context the author believes that there are errors in the 
book, and does not believe any of the claims in the book. Similarly, in response to my challenge, Clarke 
may suggest a context shift between acknowledging one’s fallibility and entertaining a particular ordinary 
belief. One difficulty with this account is that, while some may find it acceptable that when one considers 
the preface one suspends judgments on all claims in the book, it is less plausible that when one considers a 
method’s fallibility one suspends all beliefs formed through that method. Another difficulty is that this 
account presupposes an implausibly neat distinction between the preface and the book context: it seems 
perfectly fine to say things like ‘Yes, yes, it’s possible that some of the historical records are mistaken’ and 
then go on to make claims based on historical records. Such combinations of claims can be present even 
in the same sentence (and thus in the same context): ‘The Roman Empire fell in 476AD, yet it’s possible 
that some of the historical records are mistaken’. 
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more likely to be maintained in stringent or demanding contexts where spaces of relevant 
doxastic possibilities are larger, while beliefs held with less conviction are more likely to be lost 
in those contexts. Therefore, in general the former type of belief is stabler across context-shifts 
than the latter. 
The problem with this account is that it introduces a distinction between two completely 
different types of confidence, degrees of credence and counterfactual belief status, which seems to be ad 
hoc, not independently motivated. First, there seems to be no ambiguity in the notion of 
confidence when it is used for degrees of full belief and when it is used for degrees of partial 
belief. The thesis that ‘confidence’ is ambiguous between different senses doesn’t seem to have 
any ordinary language basis. This word doesn’t pass any of the standard tests for ambiguity 
discussed by philosophers and linguists. Let us consider one such test by way of example. 
According to the ‘contradiction’ test, embedding an ambiguous term A (such as ‘bank’) in a 
sentence of the form ‘This is A but it is not A’ may sound awkward but it doesn’t sound 
contradictory. Now consider the sentence ‘Mary is confident that p but is not confident that p’. It 
seems pretty clear that this sentence has no non-contradictory readings. Thus ‘confidence’ 
doesn’t pass the ‘contradiction’ test for ambiguous terms.15  
Second, from a phenomenological point of view, degrees of confidence in full and partial beliefs 
seem to be the same type of thing. Intuitively, my feeling of being more confident that one plus 
one equals two than that my partner was a good football player before we ever met (two outright 
beliefs) is of the same kind than my feeling of being more confident that Donald Trump will be 
impeached than that I will not catch a cold more than twice during the next year (two 
propositions in which I am pretty confident but do not fully believe). The above considerations 
indicate that it is wrong to distinguish two kinds of confidence, one referring to degrees of 
credence and the other to the counterfactual stability of doxastic attitudes. The standard notion 
of confidence that applies to degrees of partial belief is extensible to degrees of outright belief as 
well. But if the former is reducible to comparative degrees of probability, it is plausible that the 
latter is as well. 
In this regard, the threshold view and TCS clearly have an advantage over COS, for they provide 
a unified account of degrees of beliefs (both full and partial) in terms of degrees of credence. In 
this picture, degrees of credence match with degrees of belief across the whole spectrum from 
negative to positive absolute certainty, adhering to the semantic unity of confidence ascriptions 
and our ordinary phenomenological intuitions about confidence. 
 
3.3. Beliefs of unconscious subjects 
People have beliefs even when they are temporarily unconscious. For instance, it is natural to 
think that my partner believes that two plus two equals four also when asleep. Can COS 
accommodate this property of belief?  
Recall that according to COS, belief is a three-place relation between a believer, a proposition 
and a context, where the context is determined by the space of live possibilities, i.e., the 
possibilities that the subject currently considers. Since there are no live possibilities for 
unconscious and dreamless sleeping subjects, in such cases the sort of context required for belief 
by COS seems to be absent.  
COSists could adopt one of the following two interpretations of unconscious subjects’ doxastic 
life. First, they could say that since an unconscious subject is currently not entertaining any 
possibility, the context is indeed absent. Since the existence of a context is a necessary condition 
for having beliefs, a subject doesn’t have any belief as long as she is not conscious. Alternatively, 
the COSist may conceive the context of an unconscious subject as constituted by an empty set. 
Since according to COS, believing p is taking p to be true across the whole set of relevant 
                                               
15 For a list of other ambiguity tests see Sennet (2016: §4).  
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doxastic possibilities, and every proposition would be counted as true across an empty set of 
possibilities, it follows that an unconscious subject believes every proposition.16  
Both diagnoses seem to be highly problematic. It seems utterly absurd to think that an 
unconscious subject somehow believes everything—including every contradiction or absurd 
proposition. It seems wrong to think of sleeping people as radically irrational in this way. As for 
the diagnosis that unconscious subjects don’t have any belief at all, this is very counterintuitive 
and conflicts with all the main theories of belief in philosophy of mind, including mainstream 
theories such as representationalism and functionalism. According to representationalism, to 
have a belief is to stand in a particular relation to a mental representation. A mental 
representation is some mental structure instantiated somewhere in the mind or brain and is 
poised to perform certain (typically computational) functions within the mind that often bear 
only remote connections to stimuli, behaviour, and phenomenology. In this picture, being 
temporarily unconscious presumably won’t have any significant impact on the existence of 
mental representations. Unconscious subjects should be counted as maintaining at least most 
beliefs during temporary unconsciousness. Functionalists hold that having a belief is to be in a 
state that exhibits certain functional roles, i.e. specific actual and potential causal relations to 
sensory stimulations, behaviours, and other mental states. Again, being temporarily unconscious 
presumably doesn’t affect the potential manifestation of relevant functional roles characteristic 
of beliefs under the right triggering conditions. Thus, according to functionalism, unconscious 
subjects have beliefs as well.  
These issues actually extend over a much wider range, since the problem of indeterminate 
contexts is not merely confined to cases of unconscious subjects. Live error possibilities require 
those possibilities to be brought into the subject’s working memory and trigger controlled 
cognitive processing as opposed to automatic or heuristic modes. However, we form many of 
our beliefs in an immediate and spontaneous way without triggering any deliberative process. In 
other words, in many ordinary cases we form beliefs in circumstances in which the type of 
context required by COS would be undefined.  
In contrast, TCS has no problem in accommodating beliefs of unconscious subjects and beliefs 
formed subconsciously. This is because for TCS there is nothing like a doxastic context 
constitutive of the metaphysical nature of belief and determined by the space of salient error 
possibilities. According to TCS, contextual factors can contingently affect degrees of confidence 
by modifying credence distributions, but such factors are not supposed to be metaphysical 
constituents of doxastic attitudes. Thus subjects can maintain their degrees of credence and 
beliefs when they are unconscious or asleep.  
 
 
4. The lottery problem 
So far I have assessed COS and TCS against a series of features of belief. While TCS can easily 
accommodate all of them, COS has either difficulties or disadvantages in explaining the data. 
This provides at least some prima facie reasons in favour of TCS over COS. However, as argued 
by Clarke (2013), Greco (2015) and Dodd (2017), COS seems to be better positioned than the 
threshold view in accommodating some other important features of belief. In particular, it has 
been argued that COS can accommodate the fact that it is possible (and indeed quite common) 
for one not to believe that one’s lottery ticket in a fair lottery is a loser despite the very high 
likelihood of it being a loser, while TCS cannot.17 Suppose that you own a lottery ticket that is 
                                               
16 Note that this applies not only to those who are merely temporarily unconscious, but also to those 
who are long-term or even permanently unconscious—at least as long as they have a mind. 
17 I focus here on what I consider the most important (alleged) explanatory advantage of COS over TCS. 
Unfortunately, for reasons of space here I cannot provide a full discussion of other alleged advantages of 
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part of a fair lottery of n tickets. Your credence that your ticket is a loser is thus !"#!  . On the 
standard threshold view, belief is reducible to degrees of credence above a certain threshold. 
Thus, if n is sufficiently high, it is impossible for you not to believe that your ticket will lose 
before knowing the result, which is strikingly counterintuitive. The same problem doesn’t 
directly apply to TCS, for this view is neutral on whether belief can be fully reduced to credence 
above a certain threshold or not. However, I take it as a challenge for TCS to explain how it is 
possible for someone not to believe that her lottery ticket is a loser in these circumstances.  
A possible solution could appeal to psychological heuristics. As argued by Nagel (2011), the 
presentation of numerical odds in the lottery would trigger controlled processing as opposed to 
the automatic and heuristic cognitive mode (ibid.: 11). Importantly, according to Nagel, different 
cognitive modes of presentation can deliver different reactions to the same proposition. In cases 
where questions on whether a certain lottery proposition is true are made explicit in reasoning, 
presumably the triggered controlled reasoning in cognition processing inhibits or defeats the use 
of heuristics responsible for the formation of outright beliefs. Hence it is possible for one to 
refrain from believing the lottery proposition in such situations.  
Another way to respond to the challenge is to distinguish credence from different mental 
attitudes such as probability estimates: while the latter attitudes would be exclusively influenced 
by statistical evidence, the former should be at least partially informed by non-statistical features 
of evidence (Fassio & Gao forthcoming, Smith 2016). Thus in the lottery case, although the 
probability estimate of my ticket being a loser is very high, normal people tend not to consider 
the estimate alone as sufficient to constitute a proper basis for forming a full belief. 18  
While TCS seems to have the resources to meet the challenge accommodating doxastic attitudes 
about lotteries, it is important to observe that lottery cases are also problematic for COS—
indeed I would say even more problematic for COS than TCS. A number of philosophers have 
argued that it is perfectly possible (and even rational) to believe that one’s lottery ticket will lose 
(see e.g. McGlynn 2013; Reed 2010). However, according to COS, one believes p only if one’s 
credence in p is one. It follows that, if someone accepts that the lottery is fair, and thus that there 
is a very small chance of winning, it is impossible (not merely irrational) for her to believe that 
                                                                                                                                                  
COS. One such advantage is that COS would provide a simpler explanation of a range of qualitative 
dispositions involved in believing p, such as the commitment to the truth of p and taking p for granted in 
reasoning in appropriate circumstances. The challenge for the threshold view is to explain how changes 
of credence that just falls short of the threshold level do not make any qualitative difference to one’s 
dispositions while changes crossing the threshold level do. COS can easily avoid this problem. Having 
credence one in p implies that one excludes all possibilities one takes to be incompatible with p. Hence a 
belief that p completely commits one to the truth of p and to take p for granted in reasoning.  An anti-
reductionism version of TCS could solve the problem by appealing to the phenomenon of ‘cognitive 
closure’, a new feature causally produced by high credence but not constituted by it. When one’s credence 
in p is high enough, as a psychological fact, one closes her mind on whether p and discounts possibilities 
entailing not-p. See Weisberg (forthcoming, §3) for detailed discussion and Tang (2015) for a similar 
solution. This solution also addresses the arbitrariness problem for determining the threshold: since the 
threshold should be the point at which qualitative dispositions emerges as a result of a certain high degree 
of credence. See Gao (2016: Ch.5, §1) for further discussion of these issues. 
18 It is also worth noting that, while the lottery paradox seems to favor the credence-one view over the 
threshold view, other structurally similar paradoxes seem rather to support the opposite conclusion. A 
notable example is the preface paradox (Makinson 1965). According to this paradox, it seems reasonable 
to believe a long list of propositions but not their conjunction. COS and the credence-one view entail 
closure of one’s beliefs, and thus are incompatible with the possibility of not believing the conjunction. 
On the contrary, the threshold view can easily explain the conjunction failure in terms of the small 
uncertainty attached to each proposition in the list, which leads to a much higher accumulated risk of 
error in the conjunction. However, see Clarke (2017) for a COSist response to this challenge.  
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her ticket is a loser. COS must thus conclude that all people who think to have outright beliefs 
that their tickets in a fair lottery are losers (including a notable number of philosophers and 
myself) are actually wrong about their own mental states on the matter. This seems a seriously 
problematic consequence of COS, even worse than that faced by TCS. The latter view can 
deploy one of the possible solutions considered above in explaining why someone could not 
believe that her lottery ticket is a loser, while also allowing the possibility of believing that one’s 
lottery ticket is a loser.19  
 
        
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have considered two competing versions of credal sensitivism, COS and TCS. I 
have argued that COS faces serious problems in accommodating a range of important facts 
about beliefs. TCS is not affected by any such problem. I have then considered an alleged 
advantage of COS over TCS and argued that, far from being decisive, this may rather be a 
further problem for COS. Although the above considerations may not conclusively establish the 
superiority of TCS over COS, I hope I have shown that on balance TCS fares better than COS 
on a number of points. This should provide at least prima facie reasons for favouring TCS over 
COS.  
Although the paper has initially been structured as concerning an in-house debate amongst 
upholders of doxastic sensitivism, some of the arguments in the paper can be considered as 
independently addressing the more general dispute between the credence-one view and the 
threshold view. More specifically, the paper addresses the dispute by comparing the most 
plausible form of the credence-one view (COS) and a non-standard version of the threshold 
view (TCS). Thus, another important conclusion we can draw from my discussions is that 
contrary to what advocates of COS have claimed, we have good reasons to abandon the 
credence-one view once and for all and to embrace some version of the threshold view.   
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